A college (or any institution) saves when it takes in more than it spends. In higher education, data on institutional saving and revenue sources convey a remarkable amount of information. This study focuses on translating newly available data on saving into its implications for the future of U.S. higher education.
• Future wealth. This measure consequently implies future nontuition income-hence, growth or repositioning in the pecking order with better students and faculty and educational quality.
For all schools taken together, institutional saving describes:
• Changes in the future economic structure of higher education-who's getting ahead, who's falling behind, and how this repositioning is changing the market.
• A measure of what fraction of higher education's revenues are generated by its commercial aspect through sales revenues and what part by its role as a nonprofit charity through donations.
• The structure of tuition prices in a market where colleges engage simultaneously in both commerce and charity but to very different degrees among them.
• The distribution among schools of current well-being-which schools of what kind are under pressure.
• Whether disparities in wealth among schools-with all they imply about the concentration of student and faculty quality (Frank & Cook, 1995; Hoxby & Terry, 1999) -are increasing or decreasing (Winston, 2000a) .
In the private sector, wealth provides a major part of the nontuition resources that allow a school to subsidize its students, offering them a costly education at a modest price. The greater the wealth, the larger that student subsidy can be and, hence, the larger the gap between cost and price. In elite public-sector schools, appropriations support similar student subsidies with similar effects on selectivity and quality. Putting public and private sectors together, the most recent national data (for 1996) show that the average student at a U.S. college or university got a yearly subsidy of $9,000; he or she paid $4,000 for a $13,000 education. (The methodology for this calculation comes from Gordon Winston and Ivan Yen, 1995 , updated with 1995 -1996 The difference in subsidies between the public and private sectors was negligible; the average school's subsidy was $8,999 in the public sector and $9,033 in the private sector. This population (and therefore the subsidy scale) differs slightly from that in Winston and Yen (1995) , because not all schools for which we had subsidy data provided the information needed to compute saving. Though averages may be much the same between sectors, student subsidies range from $2,053 in the bottom decile of private schools to $25,017 in the top. This subsidy hierarchy, in turn, translates into a hierarchy of student, faculty, and institutional quality (Winston, 1999) . Admittedly, educational spending and quality are not the same thing; but in the words of Nobel Laureate Val Fitch, "Excellence can't be bought, but it must be paid for" (News, 1997) .
It is this central role of institutional wealth in determining student subsidies-and hence student and faculty selectivity and quality-that makes understanding saving behavior an urgent matter. Saving behavior describes how such wealth is built, where it comes from, how it is being distributed, and how that distribution is changing. The wealthiest colleges and universities showed truly stunning yearly increases in endowment wealth (much of it saving) in 1999-2000: Harvard, $5 billion; Yale, $3 billion; Princeton, $2 billion, Cornell, $750 million; Williams, $500 million; and Carleton, $135 million (Carleton, 1997; Lively & Street, 2000) . In the context of the recent downturn in the stock market, saving begins to seem like a rather important measure of the fortunes of U.S. colleges and universities.
Until recently, it has been next to impossible to generate data on the saving being done by colleges and universities. The U.S. Department of Education's Integrated Postsecondary Educational Data System (IPEDS), a national financial database for higher education, is missing some important data on revenue. At the individual-school level, the use of a truly opaque accounting system in its financial reports made it at least a two-week chore to tease out the relevant information. Thankfully, new accounting standards now require that private-sector colleges and universities report a single line for the institution as a whole showing the year's saving as simply the year's change in net wealth.
In this paper, we estimate institutional saving and revenue sources in U.S. higher education, first for 1995-1996, and then, to give a broader context and a sense of trends, for a smaller panel of schools that allows estimates for 1986-1987, 1990-1991, and 1995-1996. We emphasize both the level and the variety of these critical determinants among schools. We find that savings is a highly volatile and unevenly distributed element in higher education. The implication is that the rich are getting richer; and when times are tough, it is wealthy schools that are best able to weather the storm. The significance of differential saving rates becomes unmistakable in a 30-year simulation of existing wealth disparities and their concomitantsmeaning a projection of what present saving patterns will do, if maintained for 30 years, to the shape and structure of U.S. higher education.
The saving estimates also say something significant about where this wealth is coming from. Tuition constitutes only 25% of total revenues at the average institution in our 1995-1996 sample. More than anything else in our study, this reality reinforces the fact that these schools are not the profit-maximizing entities of Economics 101. Accordingly, the behavioral and efficiency results based on that assumption do not apply here in any simple way.
INCOME, SAVING, AND THE GROWTH OF WEALTH
It is useful to begin with some simple accounting tautologies central to the role that saving plays in the resource structure of colleges. One defines the way that saving fits into the structure of a college's income, spending, and subsidy flows in any year. Another describes the relentless-even mechanical-effect that one year's saving has on the next year's wealth. And a third describes the feedback, over time, of saving on wealth, and so on. Because much of this economic structure is different than in other institutional settings, it needs to be spelled out.
A college exhibits traits that make it simultaneously like a car dealer and a church. It sells its product, but does so at charitably subsidized prices that do not nearly cover production costs. Henry Hansmann (1980) calls such arrangements donative-commercial nonprofit enterprise.
This unfamiliar economic structure is summarized in Figure 1 , a simple image of the sources and uses of its funds, a term that includes all of a year's economic resource flows, including the value of capital services from owned capital stocks (Winston & Yen, 1995) . The height of the first bar, (a), describes the sources of funds, the college's total yearly income that includes net tuition revenues, gifts, appropriations, and total returns on the school's net assets, both financial and physical-broadly, tuition revenues and revenues from charitable donations, past and present. The magnitudes represented are expressed per student FTE and are roughly appropriate to the average U.S. school in 1996; the magnitudes of need-and merit-based financial aid are based on (McPherson & Schapiro, 1994) . The second bar, (b), shows the uses of those funds. Only two need to be distinguished for present purposes: the current cost of producing the year's education (including capital service costs) and saving. It is useful to indicate, too, the two forms that saving can take-as net financial or physical capital investments. By definition, sources equal uses. The magnitudes in Figure 1 are consistent with the 1996 national per-student averages.
The remaining bars in Figure 1 embed much of the uniqueness of a college's economic structure: column (c) recognizes the noneducational activities that are important to some schools; column (d) shows educational production cost and the fact that only a small part is covered by the price the student pays (net tuition); column (e) breaks the resulting student subsidy into individual financial aid and a general subsidy all students receive because full tuition is set below cost; finally, column (f) breaks down the financial aid portion of subsidy into need-based and merit aid components.
In short, the first two columns of Figure 1 frame the year's saving. Income that is not used to cover production costs during the year is saved in the form of increased financial or physical wealth. It is important, of course, that a school can also dissave, spending more than it takes in during the year by reducing its net wealth-liquidating assets or increasing debt.
This relationship between flows and stocks rests on the second useful tautology: A year's saving causes an equal change in net wealth between the beginning and the end of the year. If a college saves $7 million during the year, that $7 million must show up as an increase in financial or physical assets, as a reduction in liabilities, or both. Conversely, any change in a college's net wealth can only be the result of its saving or dissaving. It is this simple correspondence between stocks and flows, net wealth and saving, that allows us to generate saving estimates-income less spending-from IPEDS data that do not report all of a college's income. Since any change in wealth can be due only to saving, we derive educational saving estimates for a year (a flow) through a comparison of schools' net wealth at the beginning and end of that year (stocks).
The final relationship important to the analysis of saving is a dynamic feedback. As saving increases wealth, it increases future asset income, ceteris paribus, which supports increased future spending or saving or both. This, of course, is how the rich get richer. And since all this plays out in a hierarchy of schools where differential wealth goes far to determine position, and position determines a school's access to student and faculty quality, the importance of institutional saving is clear. Schools that save a lot, relative to others, will move up in the hierarchy; those that don't will move down. To the extent that differences in saving are correlated with current wealth, ex- Figure 1 . Global income, costs, prices, subsidies, and aid per FTE student. isting disparities between rich and poor schools will be increased. In other words, the economic structure of higher education will become more unequal (Winston, 2000a) . Therefore, differences in institutional saving can contribute to the increasing concentration of the best students among the high-subsidy schools identified by Caroline Hoxby and Bridget Terry (1999) and by Robert Frank and Philip Cook (1995) .
DATA AND METHODS
Like the earlier studies of institutional subsidies and capital stocks and services Winston & Yen, 1995) , we derived the data reported here from the U.S. Department of Education's Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) (U.S. Department of Education, 1991 Education, , 1996 .
The population of schools used was limited to accredited U.S. colleges and universities (meaning those with Carnegie classifications) with an undergraduate enrollment of at least 100 students in which undergraduates represented 20% or more of the student population. The 1995-1996 population of targeted schools relevant to these saving estimates was further reduced (by 19 schools) to eliminate those for which subsidy estimates had not been made. The result was 2,109 schools that could generate both subsidy estimates and saving data for 1995-1996. Of these, 1,170 were public institutions and 939 were private. Although this population is somewhat smaller than that used to generate the student subsidy and physical capital estimates for U.S. higher education Winston & Yen, 1995) , it reflects the same broad characteristics both by type and control and by subsidy hierarchy. A subset of those schools-1,581-also had data that estimates savings for 1986-1987 and 1990-1991 as well, thus forming a group of schools whose savings estimates spanned the decade.
Broadly, the necessary data to compute savings consists of each school's net wealth-assets less liabilities-at the beginning and end of each year, separated into physical and financial forms. Changes in a school's net wealth, then, define its saving for that year (Winston, 1994) . If assets and liabilities were reported separately and exhaustively for physical and financial wealth at the beginning and end of each year, the task of generating the saving estimates would be straightforward. Unfortunately, fund accounting, or the practice of reporting an institution's accounts as the interaction of many distinct functional entities, was the most typical accounting format used during the period of these data. Wealth is spread across these functional categories, buried in a web of intra-institutional transactions.
One irresolvable difficulty lies in the IPEDS reporting of financial wealth. Some of the liabilities associated with endowment funds are not reported. For example, an endowment fund combines "true endowment" with "funds functioning as endowment," each with assets and potential liabilities. But IPEDS reports a single figure summing assets from two categories while another number reports assets net of liabilities but only for funds functioning as endowment. This procedure obscures deriving assets net of liabilities for the endowment fund as a whole or for both parts separately. We have chosen to ignore these liabilities and simply use combined assets. After examining 20 or so audited annual reports from this period from individual public and private college and universities, we have confidence that changes in liabilities in endowment funds had little effect on net wealth. Fortunately, our interest is in changes in wealth and not in levels of wealth where these neglected liabilities would play a larger role.
Physical wealth estimates present other problems. In particular, they produce a fundamental difficulty in the absence of data on deferred maintenance (i.e., allowing facilities or other durable assets to wear out). The relationship of deferred maintenance to a school's physical wealth is similar to that of liabilities to its financial wealth: Net physical wealth is gross wealth less deferred maintenance. A proper accounting of physical and financial capital in a nonprofit firm treats them symmetrically with the replacement value of physical capital describing an asset (market) value that is offset by the liability of any accumulated deferred maintenance to leave their difference as net physical wealth, identical conceptually to financial net worth. Adding financial and physical net worth together, then, gives a useful and consistent measure of total institutional net wealth (Winston, 1992 (Winston, , 1993 Winston & Yen, 1995) .
Like our predicament with the missing endowment numbers, though, the problem of missing physical liability data appears far less serious when the relevant quantity for calculating saving is the change in accumulated deferred maintenance within the year, typically a much smaller quantity. However, the absence of such physical liability figures creates "noise" in our numbers. Estimates of physical saving, then, are based on differences in the sum of reported book values of buildings, equipment, and land at the beginning and end of each year.
A final problem with physical assets is that IPEDS asks schools to report all capital used rather than all capital owned. This introduces further noise into the estimates of capital saving. An increase in the value of the capital stock rented by a school will appear as an increase in wealth, but it would clearly not represent saving at all. However, the magnitudes again appear to be small.
A short introduction on the interpretation of the savings estimates is also in order. An individual college or university may have little choice in how to use its saving. At both private and public institutions, donors often specify that revenues must be saved, not spent, or, if spent, restricted to particular uses. Their gifts or appropriations are available only for increased endowment (financial wealth) or to construct specified buildings (physical wealth). As noted below, such restrictions appear especially relevant to schools in the public sector. Assets, too, differ markedly in their liquidity, with a school's physical assets much less liquid than all but the most illiquid of their financial assets. And finally, in the short run, saving allocations will reflect the fact that it takes more planning time, typically, to invest in physical than in financial assets. Consequently, yearly variations in saving tend to be absorbed initially by changes in financial wealth and to show up as changes in physical wealth only with a lag. These differences add to the importance of distinguishing between financial and physical saving in what follows.
In producing these saving estimates-as in earlier estimates of costs and capital stocks Winston & Yen, 1995) -we have made an effort to report only that portion of institutional saving due to each school's educational activities, eliminating any contribution made by other, noneducational functions, including service and sponsored research in a complex multiproduct institution. This differentiation is a crude but necessary recognition of sharp differences among schools in the importance of educational activities. For each school, we reduced estimated total saving in proportion to the importance of noneducational costs in their total costs. It is this result that we report as educational saving, following the procedure used by Duc-Le To (Winston-Yen, 1995) . Finally, we accommodate the problems in comparing schools of different sizes by reporting data throughout per student FTE.
SAVING BY COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, 1996
Certainly, the most fundamental fact in Table 1 is that U.S. colleges and universities saved a great deal in 1996. On the basis of these schools, we can estimate that educational saving in all of U.S. higher education was roughly $25 billion. The average school saved just over $7 million. The year's saving for the average student was $2,500. By form, financial saving dominated overall, representing nearly 70% of the total. (All figures describe saving associated with schools' educational function only.)
The next two lines of Table 1 reveal significant, but not surprising, differences between public-and private-sector schools in both their saving and the form it took. Average saving in the public sector was $683 per student of which only 17% or $114 added to new financial wealth leaving the other 83%-$568 per student-as additions to physical capital. In contrast is the private sector, where average saving per student was much greater at $4,708. Furthermore, 79% of that ($3,699) took the form of new financial wealth. The remaining $1,009 or 21% was new net physical capital.
These differences between sectors reflect fundamental differences in financing. For schools in the private sector, saving and wealth act in familiar ways: financial wealth provides both insurance against contingencies and asset earnings that support student subsidies. So a private school's wealth is its primary source of both financial security and position in the hierarchy. In both sectors, wealth in the form of physical capital provides the essential and costly flow of capital services in educational production-about a quarter of total educational costs . Schools in the public sector, in contrast, rely on appropriations from taxpayers' resources as their primary source of nontuition income and the student subsidies it allows. The primary educational cost that these schools cover from their own wealth is that of physical capital services. So the average public institution has 83% of its total wealth in the form of physical capital and only 17% in financial wealth. It relies on appropriations both for student subsidy resources and for physical capital investments-for the things, in other words, that a private school has to provide from its own accumulated wealth and saving. Financial saving plays a much less central role in public institutions than in private.
The very different behaviors in public and private sectors in Table 1 , therefore, reflect very different roles for institutional saving and wealth. Average saving in the private sector is nearly seven times that in the public sector, and the form that saving takes is reversed between them. Roughly 80% of public-sector saving is in the form of increased physical wealth while 80% of private-sector saving is in increased financial wealth.
The top section of detail in Table 1 reports, for public and private sectors separately, average saving by schools grouped by Carnegie type. The small numbers of public liberal arts I and private research II schools suggests interpreting their data with particular caution. Clearly, very different levels of per-student saving are achieved in different types of schools, aside from the general public-private sector differences. The highest level of saving is $11,533 per student at private liberal arts I schools while the lowest is $356 at public two-year schools. Over the whole of the population, the difference is a factor of 32. Variations in saving within each sector are smaller, but they are not trivial. The liberal arts I schools at the top of the private sector save, on average, five times as much as the private two-year schools at the bottom, and the public research I universities save four times as much as the public two-year schools.
These differences become more pronounced in the bottom section of Table 1 where the data are organized, within each sector, according to the size of the subsidies schools give their students, meaning, by how much the price a student pays falls short of the full cost of his or her education. While it is not surprising that per-student saving is highly correlated with subsidy ranking, the magnitude of differences in average saving may be unexpected. Over the whole population, the highest saving schools (average private schools in the top decile) saved fully 65 times as much per student as the average public schools in the seventh decile.
IMPLICATIONS

Performance
We described a school's saving in the introduction as an effective indicator of its economic performance-a sort of "bottom line." The school with positive saving had a good year; the school with negative saving did not. Positive saving describes sustainable behavior; negative saving does not. Furthermore, how much a school saved is at least a partial measure of its financial slack or buffer-or the distance of the wolf from the door. Both sign and magnitude of saving are indicators of a school's economic performance for the year.
The seventh column of Table 1 reports how many schools in each segment will get into trouble if neither their economic circumstances nor their behavior changes. It identifies what proportion of each school population saw their wealth reduced during the year. An individual school's net financial worth (relatively liquid wealth) divided by its negative saving describes how long it could maintain its financial course; this measure is akin to the "cash burn rate" so important to start-up internet companies and their demise. Of course, a single year's performance, even if it is significantly unsustainable because it generates large negative saving, holds little threat for a school whose wealth (or government backing) provides a buffer sufficiently ample to give it time to change that behavior.
Once again, these figures reflect the deep difference in the role that saving plays in public and private sectors. Overall, 18% of the schools in this population had negative saving in 1996, but far more public (21%) than private (14%) schools fell below that line. The average amount of negative saving for schools in these two groups was $1,780 per FTE student. Their average wealth was $25,000 per student as compared to the overall population average of $33,000, so poorer schools have a stronger tendency to dissave, even though they can afford it least. However, since public institutions derive a major part of their support from their government, they can responsibly operate closer to the line, risking negative saving in any year. The differences by Carnegie type within public and private sectors seem to be both significant and unsurprising. Very few public research or doctoral universities engaged in negative saving while about a quarter of public twoyear and liberal arts colleges did. In the private sector, very few schools in the segments dominated by wealthy schools-research I universities and liberal arts I colleges-had negative saving (0% and 6%, respectively) while many more private liberal arts II and two-year colleges failed to break even (17% and 20%). When we organized the data by student subsidy, no clear pattern emerged in the public sector while a mild trend was evident among private schools with a higher proportion of the poorer, low-subsidy schools showing potential financial problems. If anything is unexpected about these results, it is the absence of stronger patterns.
While the existence of positive or negative saving is the bright line in a college's performance evaluation, measures that capture magnitudes are also suggested by the parallel between colleges' saving and firms' profits. The difference between larger and smaller saving is an important one. The obvious measure to borrow from an ordinary firm would be saving as a percent of sales revenues. But, of course, college "sales" (tuition) revenues are so small a part of either its total income or the value of its production because so much is covered by nonsales donations as discussed below that the appropriate denominator with which to judge magnitudes here has to be a college's total revenues, including both sales and charitable income. For a competitive for-profit firm in equilibrium, there are, of course, no donations, so total revenues and sales revenues come to the same thing.
Column 8 in Table 1 shows the magnitude of the year's saving relative to colleges' total revenues, the distance between their current performance, and the unsustainable performance represented by negative saving-breathing space or slack.
Except for the two types of public-sector schools that have very low absolute levels-liberal arts II and two-year colleges-saving in that sector is almost proportional to revenues: about 10%. Within the private sector, in contrast, schools range from saving 16% and 17% of their total revenues where saving is the most meager in both absolute and relative terms (twoyear and comprehensive universities) to saving 23% and 32% for those with the largest saving (liberal arts I colleges and research I universities). When ordered by the size of their student subsidies, public-sector schools show strong differences in sheer dollar amounts of saving, meaning that those with the largest student subsidies do the most saving per student. However, that saving is not reflected in the proportions of total revenues saved where the pattern is much weaker. Among private-sector schools, those with the highest subsidies not only save the most dollars per student but also save the largest proportion of their total revenues. Again, it is not surprising that ampler saving by wealthy and well-supported schools gives them a larger buffer-more slack-than poorer schools. Nor is it surprising, given the very different roles played by saving in public and private sectors, that both levels of saving and differences among schools are greater in the private sector.
1 Indeed, in general, these data generate few surprises. That finding could be either disappointing in its lack of new illumination or reassuring in the fact that the basic savings estimates appear to make good intuitive sense, allowing us to use them with some confidence.
Saving, Growth, and Disparities
We might push the parallel of savings and business profits one step further to discuss saving relative to schools' physical and financial wealth as another reasonable measure of performance-a sort of "rate of return on invested capital." That relationship, however, appears to be much more significant for a college (with its nondistribution constraint) as an indication of the rate of growth of its wealth and all that that implies. Again, while acknowledging the difference between public and private schools that makes saving so much more central to the latter, the future of a private school is heavily dependent on its current saving.
Wealth (physical and financial) supports student subsidies in a privatesector school that, in turn, generates student demand, which is turned into excess demand by restricted supply allowing more selective admissions based on student quality (Winston, 1999) . Peer effects amplify the effect of student quality on educational quality, demand, selectivity, and student quality.
For an individual school, these factors play out within a hierarchy of competing schools that give very different student subsidies, primarily because of differences in their wealth. With a limited supply of student quality, the market is essentially positional, with any school's access to student quality dependent largely on its relative ability to offer student subsidies and exploit peer effects-in short, on its position in the hierarchy. With wealth a defining aspect of position within the private sector, saving becomes the route to improvement-to the "excellence" embedded in virtually all collegiate mission statements and most trustees' boardrooms.
For the individual school in the private sector, sustained saving leads to very desirable results. If that school saves more than competing schools, it gains the ability to support larger student subsidies in the future, to replace those schools in the pecking order, and to wind up with better students, faculty, and facilities to show for it. It is a demanding choice whether to opt for reducing current saving to increasing current spending or lowering the current price-thereby increasing the current subsidy and current student demand-or, alternatively, increasing saving by sacrificing current subsidies to be able to pay larger subsidies in the future. Bigger subsidies and better competitive position now or in the future? Subsidies or saving? And the success or failure of the decision will depend not only, or primarily, on that one school's decision, but on what its competitors do, too. The ultimate test of its decision will be the effect it has on its relative wealth and subsidies.
The school in the public sector will face the same hierarchical pressures for excellence in the market, but the source of its nontuition resources will be government support that does not flow from its own institutional saving. The public-sector institution that does well in the hierarchy will have its faculty, students, and facilities well supported by generous appropriations. Such an institution could choose to internally concentrate resources in an "enclave" honors college that mimics better-endowed schools, but such a decision is made at the expense of the other students on that campus.
But examining the whole structure of higher education raises a different and also socially important question about institutional saving and its effect on the distribution of future wealth among schools. Because the currently wealthiest schools also have the highest saving rates, the differentiation among schools in the future will only increase. The rich will become even richer, and wealth disparities among institutions-with consequent disparities in costs, prices, subsidies, and quality-will also increase. Gordon Winston (2000b) used saving data for 1986-1987, 1990-1991, and 1995-1996 to address this issue of growing wealth disparities. Table 2 summarizes the evidence on these disparities. The bottom 20% of schools, ranked by the size of their student subsidies, did a bit over 11% of the total saving. At the other end, the top 20% of the schools did nearly 50% of total saving. Narrowing that top group further, the top 5% did 28% of saving while the top 1% did more than 11%. Gini coefficients measure the degree of distributional inequality, with higher values (between zero and one) describing greater inequality. These coefficients show that savings were highly concentrated among schools with already large student subsidies. The next four columns of Table 2 show the results of a simple simulation projecting the distribution of future student subsidies if savings continued the same pattern for 10, 20, and 30 years. The result is a consistent increase in disparities measured by steadily increasing Gini coefficients on the distribution of subsidies. The last two columns show the effect of compound growth as saving augments wealth, augmenting income and saving and growth, and so on. Projected 30 years out, the current distribution of saving among schools would create a distribution of wealth and subsidies significantly more unequal than at present.
Completing a Global Accounting
Returning to the larger 1996 population, it is probably surprising that the most useful result from deriving estimates of schools' saving may not be directly related to their saving, per se, but instead to the fact that saving estimates make it possible, finally, to close the circle on a full "global" accounting of colleges-to complete estimates for the taxonomy of Figure 1 . As noted earlier, these estimates reflect only the educational activities of colleges and universities. For years, economic reporting by colleges and universities adhered to the rules of "fund accounting" that effectively divided each school's economic activities into seven or so separate funds, each one treated as a separate little firm with lending, borrowing, and transfers between them and no recognition of capital service costs. The result was an incomplete and even incoherent economic reporting that made it very difficult to get a whole picture of a school's economic activities. IPEDS financial data were collected similarly, with only a partial reporting of income (Winston, 1992) . As long as information on revenues and saving is missing, we cannot determine the height of either the first or the second bar in Figure 1 . We had all necessary information on net tuition and fees ("commercial revenues") on the bottom of the first bar and everything necessary about costs on the bottom of the second, but it was not possible to estimate saving in a direct way as the difference between total income and expenditures because part of income was missing. However, the necessary identity of sources and uses of funds-the fact that the first two bars have to have the same heightmeans that we could measure saving and, consequently, derive the noncommercial component of income as the difference between uses (expenditures and saving) and net tuition income. Table 3 reports a complete global accounting: Funds come from commercial (tuition) revenues or charitable donations (broadly defined) and are either used to support current production or are saved.
An even more significant fact emerges from the sources and uses of funds reported in Table 3 . At the most basic level, the dual nature of colleges and universities as charities and commercial firms has made it difficult to understand their economics. In many ways, they fit the familiar models of forprofit commercial firms with prices, customers, production, and demand. The temptation has been great to treat them like another familiar business firm. But in crucial respects, like charging prices that cover only a fraction of production costs, colleges and universities do real violence to that model and its implications (Winston, 1999) .
In spite of the fact that the dual economic nature of colleges and universities has become increasingly clear over the last decade, it has not been possible to say, with any confidence, how important each of those parts is. Are these institutions essentially charities with a minor commercial component, like a museum with a gift shop? Or are they really commercial firms with minor charitable activities, like a large corporation with its public relations department? The answer, of course, can be found only in the sources of their supporting revenue. How much of it comes from charitable donations and how much from sales proceeds? Those data have been unavailable until we had a complete global accounting system that captured all of a school's educational revenues.
With these estimates of saving, we can measure a school's income and decompose that income into charitable donations and commercial sales revenues to see which-church or car dealer-is more important. The surprisingly unambiguous result is that higher education is, in these strictly economic terms, much more church than car dealer. This pattern is quite different from "tuition dependence" because of the way that has come to be measured. Here, we ask what part of a college's total revenue is generated by tuition and what part by donations; in the usual discussion of tuition dependence, tuition revenues are compared to current costs, ignoring both capital service costs and saving as the excess of total revenues over costs. Our data show that, overall, three-quarters of all revenues come from donations, past and present, leaving only a quarter to come from sales proceeds. It's important to reemphasize again that these figures describe the economic nature of higher education as being closer to charity than to commerce.
That fact is not trivial. It is quite urgent to understand its reality and begin including it in thinking about higher education since there is an increasing tendency to include higher education in our national love affair with privatization and the commercial market. The tendency is to hold that, if only colleges and universities can be made to behave more like for-profit business firms, higher education will better serve society-in other words, that car dealers are more efficient than colleges. 2109 $15,487 $3,998 $11,489 $13,012 $2,475 $9,014 31% All Public 1170 Thus, it is both a helpful and a significant reminder of colleges' natures that economically, their churchly role-in the simplest of dollar terms-is far more important than their commercial aspect. Colleges and universities possess their current wealth and appropriations because of their noncommercial missions. A few years ago, William Massy made the suggestionone that should appeal to the hardheaded devotees of privatization-that the aims and obligations of a college should reflect the desires of those who provide the revenues. Given its three-to-one dominance in funding, the charitable mission of higher education should, on that criterion, clearly dominate its behavior, stiffening resistance to pressures that would cut deals and maximize revenues like competing business firms and resisting attempt to judge them by a business bottom line.
All Institutions
In one stark picture, an effort to see where increasingly aggressive tuition discounting for student quality-"merit aid"-is taking higher education suggested that colleges' charitable mission might well be overwhelmed by their commercial behavior. The end-point of price competition appears likely to involve the use of schools' charitable resources to support the commercial price cuts that will make each of them more competitive in the market-or stave off their losses to higher-subsidy schools-even as that price competition drives out need-based aid, limiting low-income access to high quality education (Winston & Zimmerman, 2000) .
THE PANEL FROM 1986-1987 TO 1995-1996
The results just described rest, with one exception, on data from the larger population of 2,109 schools for which saving estimates are available from 1995-1996. In addition to that single year, we were able to construct a panel of 1,581 schools for which saving could be estimated for 1985-1986, 1990-1991, and 1995-1996 . This smaller group is quite representative of the 1996 population, making comparisons meaningful. The 1995-1996 group included 31 for-profit schools, but their main effect would be to increase the reported role of commercial revenues for 1996. Since that role would be only 25%, we did not include them in this panel of schools.
Tables 4 and 5 report on the panel data to let us see how well the averages over those three years-which include both a good year and a bad-tally with the patterns revealed by the larger population for 1995-1996 in Table  4 and how patterns in the basic data change over those three years in Table 5 .
The brief answer appears in Table 4 . Saving levels are much more modest, and differences among sectors are damped when the ups and downs of the decade are recognized. For example, 1996 was an exceptionally good year in which the strong were stronger and the weak did all right. Comparing Table 1 for 1995-1996 and Table 4 for the decade shows a drop in institutional saving from an average of $2,500 per student to $1,500 for the N 1987 1991 1996 1987 1991 1996 1987 1991 1996 1987 1991 1996 1987 1991 1996 has only the 1,581 schools for which we have data in all three years. Table 5 reports the 1996 data for just those 1,581 schools. Overall, three quarters of the revenues of higher education come from donations, leaving only a quarter from commercial sales revenues. That imbalance is greater for the public than private sector; but even among private schools, only a third of their revenue is from commercial sales. The role of charitable contributions is greater in the high-subsidy than in the low-subsidy schools, but those differences are narrower in the public than the private sector. Only in the two bottom subsidy decile averages of the private sector do sales proceeds ever contribute as much as half of total revenue. Greater freedom from commercial revenues, of course, makes larger student subsidies possible.
CONCLUSION
These saving figures are most interesting in what they reveal about more basic economic aspects of colleges and universities. The difference in the role of institutional saving between public and private sectors reflects fundamental differences in their financing as savings differ in level, volatility, and form. Even as a performance measure, saving is more revealing in the private than the public sector; where there is less self-sufficiency, schools can reasonably operate closer to the edge. Saving is quite different among schools within each sector. Disparities are large; and since high saving is concentrated in already wealthy schools, differences in saving, if they persist, will compound disparities in institutional wealth. The volatility of saving over the decade is extreme. The changes among the panel schools between 1986-1987, 1990-1991, and 1995-1996 are remarkable and show more variability among the wealthy schools than the poor. Finally, these figures close the circle to make a complete, global accounting process possible that includes most U.S. colleges and universities and yields estimates of the sources and uses of economic resources in service of their educational mission. It should prove of considerable value to determine that only a meager 25% of those resources come to colleges and universities in their role as commercial firms; the rest is due to their performance as charities in the broad service of society.
